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A. A GENERAL CONSTRAINT: SOME EVIDENCE FROM NEGATION
Chomskyl has tentatively proposed the following as a general constraint on rules of
grammar:
(1) No rule can involve a pair X, Y in the context ... X... [...Z... Y.. .] where Z is
the lexically specified "subject" of a, and a is an S or NP.
Such a constraint accounts for a variety of syntactic facts. For example, if the various
synonymous positions of each arise from a transformation moving that lexical item, 2
and if that transformation were constrained by (1), the indicated grammaticality
judgments on the following pair of sentences would be correctly predicted.
(2) The candidates wanted each other to be buried by an avalanche.
(3) "The candidates wanted an avalanche to bury each other.
For if the underlying structures contained the candidates each... the movement trans-
formation would block in (3) where there is a lexical subject between the underlying
and transformed positions of each.
Similarly, in the following NP's, the correct results would be obtained:
(4) The men read books about each other.
This work was supported by the National Institute of Mental Health (Grant
5 PO1 MH-13390-04).
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(5) :*The men read John's books about each other.
Here a is an NP and Z - John's - is the lexically specified subject of a.3
Another apparent instance of constraint (1) can be seen in the distribution of reflex-
ives. If reflexives are to be transformationally derived along the lines suggested in
Helke,4 then the following pair can be explained if the transformation in question (in this
case, a copying transformation) is constrained by (1).
(6) The men expected themselves to be run over by a truck.
(7) :*The men expected a truck to run over themselves.
Chomsky has suggested that constraint (1), or something like it, constrains not just
syntactic processes, but semantic processes as well. In this report I shall present an
example of a semantic process whose operation, at least in a certain set of cases,
seems to be constrained by (1). I have proposed5 that the interpretation of negation can
be explained in terms of a surface structure rule of interpretation depending upon linear
order and phonetic information. The rule relates in interpretation a negative element
and any one of a large class of elements including certain quantifiers, if certain struc-
tural and phonetic conditions are met. Its operation gives two possible readings for
the following sentence, one where many is understood as "negated" and one where it is
understood as "non-negated."
(8) I couldn't do many of the problems.
The two readings can be roughly paraphrased by (9) and (10).
(9) There are not many of the problems that I could do.
(10) There are many of the problems that I couldn't do.
Notice that in general, the not can be related to a quantifier within a noun phrase; that
is, that the following sentence seems ambiguous in the same way that (8) is.
(11) I couldn't understand the proofs of many of the theorems.
Both (12) and (13) seem to be available as readings for (11).
(12) There are not many of the theorems whose proofs I could understand.
(13) There are many of the theorems whose proofs I couldn't understand.
If a subject is introduced into the NP in (11), however, there is no longer a reading
available in which many is understood as negated; that is, (11') has no reading
analogous to (12).
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(11') I couldn't understand Euclid's proofs of many of the theorems.
There does seem to be a reading (13') analogous to (13).
(13') There are many of the theorems whose proofs by Euclid I couldn't understand.
If, as I have suggested, the unmarked condition for many is non-negated, and the
negated reading arises out of the operation of a negation interpretive rule, the absence
of a reading for (11') in which many is understood as negated can be explained in terms
of constraint (1), for the presence of a subject - Euclid's - in the NP would block the
normal application of the rule.
The following set of sentences represents a similar example.
(14) You didn't understand the proofs of enough of the theorems for me to be justified
in giving you an A.
(15) "You didn't understand Euclid's proofs of enough of the theorems for me to be
justified in giving you an A.
An examination of the meaning of (14) shows that enough has to be understood as being
negated for the sentence to make sense, i. e. , the content is something like "You under-
stood the proofs of some theorems but not enough . . .". If this analysis is correct, the
unacceptability of (15) is explained by constraint (1), for the presence of a subject -
Euclid's - in the noun phrase would block the semantic rule that would give the required
negation (semantically) of enough.
H. B. Lasnik
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B. WHAT INITIAL CLUSTERS TELL US ABOUT A CHILD'S
SPEECH CODE
1. Introduction
Implicit in previous developmental studies is the idea that a child's phonological sys-
tem is basically that of the adult. This idea can be blocked out as follows:
Child Language = Adult Language + Rules
(Henceforth, the A&R POSITION)
That is, child language is like adult language, except for certain regular differences
that can be described by rules. If we take this position, we need only specify the sys-
tematic ways in which the child's output differs from that of the adult. This is the
general pattern that psycholinguistic studies have followed in treating phonological
acquisition. But does this approach really get at the problem? For example, What
determines the child's representational system?
Within the current theory, there are at least two possible answers: (i) The child
perceives speech in terms of adult phonological distinctions, but has motor problems
in producing a phonetic copy of adult speech. This would mean that he perceives as the
adult, but produces imperfectly - there is a mismatch between perception and produc-
tion. (ii) The child perceives and produces in his own system. His phonological dis-
tinctions may not be the same as those of the adult. Furthermore, his system does not
necessarily have to bear some simple relationship to the adult's.
Answer (i) is consistent with the A&R POSITION, as defined above; it is also the
view that dominates the literature of the subject (cf. Leopold, l Velten, 2 Albright, 3
Smith, 4 and Moskowitz ). Answer (ii), on the other hand, is an alternative hypothesis
that has been implicitly rejected in previous studies.1
2. Initial Clusters
The differences in the two positions can oe best illustrated if we look at a particular
problem in child phonology. Initial clusters provide just this kind of test case. Sequen-
ces of more than one consonant at the beginnings of words present obvious motor dif-
ficulties to young children, even up to the age of three years. Thus it is not surprising
that children's pronunciations of clusters are "different" from those of adults. If the
A&R POSITION is right, these "differences" could be explained as the child's
"distortions" of adult speech. But if the alternative position is right, differences
would be the result of distinctions in the child's own system, and not necessarily in the
adult' s.
QPR No. 101 218
(X. LINGUISTICS)
3. Preliminary Studies
With the aim of getting data that would decide between these two positions, we have
designed a long-term study of two-year-old speech. During the past seven months, we
have sampled spontaneous speech from a group of 13 children, aged 1 1/Z to 2 1/2, all
having monolingual parents living in the Boston area. Once every three weeks, each
child was brought to a laboratory "playroom," where his speech could be recorded.
Transcriptions were made at each session. Tapes of all relevant words and phrases
were later analyzed spectrographically.
4. Results
Thus far, our transcriptions and spectrograms have shown the following regu-
larities:
(a) Clear transitions between segments of children's clusters that adults accept as
"accurate," e. g., swim i for SWIMMING (see Fig. X- 1).
Fig. X-1. Spectrogram of 26-month-old child saying SWIM.
(b) Ill-defined transitions between segments of children's clusters that adults
hear as "inaccurate" or "substituted" clusters, e.g.. f (w) i: for THREE (see
Fig. X-2), r
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Fig. X-Z. Spectrogram of the same subject as in Fig. X-1 saying THREE,
transcribed as f (w) i:.
r
and (s)f (1) ipi
w
for SLEEPING (see Fig. X-3).
Fig. X-3. SLEEPING, transcribed as (s)f (1) ipi
w
(c) Ill-defined consonant-liquid transition for obstruent-liquid clusters, like GLASS
and GRASS. Both words sounded the same to the adult ear and appeared as [gWees] in
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transcription, yet spectrograms showed consistent differences for the w that a child
made for the liquid in GRASS and the w that he made for the one in GLASS. (Differences
were in terms of F2 locus and duration of the "glide" segment.)
5. Conclusions
The results of this early study suggests that children mark the "same" phonological
distinctions as adults do, but may not use the same process for making such distinctions.
When the children produce distinctions in their speech (like /gl/ vs /gr/), these are
not distinguished by adults (who perceive both clusters as g ). This evidence gives us
some reason to question the predominant (A+R) view. Without more extensive spectro-
graphic analysis and perceptual testing, it is difficult to use our evidence to reject one
of the two hypotheses given above. Future work should enable us to decide between the
two.
Judith R. Kornfeld
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C. ON THE SEGMENTAL NATURE OF TONE IN THAI
It is often assumed that tone is a suprasegmental feature, i. e., that it is an under-
lying property of some linguistic unit larger than the segment, such as the syllable or
the morpheme. This does in fact seem to be the case for many languages (cf. McCawley,1
Leben2). Wo 3 has argued that there exist languages such as Mandarin in which phono-
logical tone is represented as a feature on segments.4 The following facts, taken from
Henderson,5 seem to indicate that Thai is one of those languages in which tone must be
treated as a segmental feature.
The following tone patterns are given for Thai:
(1) Mid
(2) Low
QPR No. 101 221
(X. LINGUISTICS)
(3) High-Low (=Falling)
(4) High Rise-Fall
(5) Low-High (=Rising).
It is safe to assume that (4) is phonologically a level high tone. Without this assumption,
the tone system would be unnecessarily complex; furthermore, the acoustic data in
Abramson 6 indicate that phonetically the pitch of (4) is just as "level" as that of (1) and
(2), and Abramson in fact calls tone (4) a high tone. An additional reason for regarding
(4) as a level tone will emerge from the discussion of its behavior in compounds.
There are two styles of speech: the isolative style, in which syllables are articu-
lated slowly as more-or-less isolated units; and the combinative style, which, in com-
pounds, causes distinctions in tone and vowel length to be neutralized to a considerable
degree. I shall assume that the representations in the isolative style are underlying
forms, and will attempt to formulate a rule for deriving from them the corresponding
compounds in the combinative style. The symbols H, M, and L beneath the forms stand
for High, Mid, and Low, respectively.
(6) Isolative
thi:
HL
thi:
HL
si:
LH
nai
LH
ni:
H
kha u
LH
Combinative
thi' nai
M LH
thi'
M
si'
M
ni:
H
kha:u
LH
In each case the tone of the first element becomes Mid, and the vowel of the first ele-
ment shortens somewhat. (In my treatment, I assume that the vowel simply becomes
short.) In the second element, there is no change at all.
The same applies to compounds in which the first element contains a long vowel and
is closed by a consonant or glide:
(7) Isolative
sa:u sa:u
LH LH
wa: 0r wa: 0
HL HL
Combinative
sau sa:u
M LH
wag wa: 0
M HL
'young girls'
'at your leisure'
One apparent exception to
ment has tone (4), which
am calling an underlying
this is the behavior of a compound whose first ele-
Henderson described as a high rise-fall, and which I
high tone:
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(8) Isolative Combinative
na:m t ~ ha: nam tQha: 'tea'
H M H M
na:m ta:n nam ta:n 'sugar'
H M H M
Here, the vowel shortens as expected, but the tone of the first element does not change
to Mid. If we regard tone (4) as high level, a fairly plausible account of the data is pos-
sible: the vowel of the first element shortens, and a complex tone is simplified to Mid.
We might ask at this point if there is any connection between the vowel shortening
and tone simplification; the two remaining forms provided by Henderson suggest that
there is:
(9) Isolative Combinative
t3 ka:n t0 ka:n 'want'
HL M HL L
thau rai thau rai 'how much'
HL M HL L
There is a change in tone from Mid to Low on the second element; there is nothing in
the data to suggest why this is the case. What is significant, however, is that in these
two words neither Vowel Shortening nor Tone Simplification applies. The behavior of
the last two examples ceases to seem exceptional if w.e take the view that Tone Simplifi-
cation occurs as a result of Vowel Shortening.
Actually, one could imagine a formulation that would generate the data presented
above without connecting Tone Simplification with Vowel Shortening. (Given the sketch-
iness of the data, it might be unwise to insist on connecting the two processes.)
The following rules might apply to the first element of a compound in the order
given:
(10) a. V . [+Mid Tone]
+Long Tone]
+Complex Tone
b. V _[-Long]
[+Long]
The first rule changes a complex tone to Mid on a long vowel; the second shortens a
long vowel. Aside from the use of the feature [Complex Tone], an ad hoc invention, the
formulation in (10a) leaves unanswered the question of why short vowels do not undergo
Tone Simplification.
A much simpler and more plausible formulation is possible if we view Tone
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Simplification as a result of Vowel Shortening. Morris Halle 7 has suggested that the
result of collapsing two segments into one is in some sense a "compromise" between
the two original segments. For example, e and o in Sanskrit result from the collapsing
of /ai/ and /au/, respectively; these collapsed forms are composed of some of the fea-
tures of each of the segments underlying them. Similarly, the nasal vowels in French,
which, on one view at least, derive from the sequence Vowel + n by a singulary
process, inherit in some of the features of each of their underlying segments.
This view, if adopted for Thai, would involve treating long vowels as sequences of
two short vowels, and regarding tone as a segmental feature that may appear on vowels
and on the coda of short syllables ending in a voiced segment (it would seem unnatural
to posit underlying tones on voiceless segments); one of the effects of Vowel Shortening,
then, would be the melding of two tones into one. In the case of (8), the two underlying
level high tones would yield a single level high tone in the first syllable of the combina-
tive form; in the other cases, the formation of the Mid tone would be the result of a
compromise between the underlying sequence of low tone plus high tone, or high tone
plus low tone- a result that seems quite natural. In place of (101 we would have a
single rule:
(11) VV --- V
The seemingly exceptional tonal behavior of the first elements of (9) is, on this analysis,
a direct consequence of the inapplicability of (11) in these cases. Furthermore, this
analysis correctly predicts the nonoccurrence of complex tone on syllables containing
a short vowel, with no voiced segment following. Since the complex tones are simply
sequences of level tones, they cannot appear on syllables that have only one segment
capable of bearing a tone - the vowel. (The nonoccurrence of the Mid tone on such
syllables remains a mystery, however.)
W. R. Leben
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D. PERFORMANCE CONSTRAINTS ON SENTENCE FORM
Fodor, Garrett, and Beverl have demonstrated that one exploits the lexical infor-
mation contained in the main verbs of (1) and (2)
(1) The man whom the child knew carried a box.
(2) The man whom the child met carried a box.
by showing that performance on both paraphrase and anagram tasks was lower on (1)
than on (2). They suggested that this decrement resulted from knew being lexically
coded to allow both complement and direct object constructions, while met is coded only
for direct object. Because two candidate structures may be entertained for knew, and
only one for met, performance is lower on tasks involving the former - presumably
because the sentences containing it are more difficult to perceive.
In these cases, the context containing the critical word (knew) constrains the inter-
pretation of the sentence to one reading. Thus, while the perceptual mechanism may
entertain two projections for the structure in which knew occurs, only one is consonant
with the string at hand.
But consider the case exemplified by (3) and (4), which contain the categorically
ambiguous word base.
(3) The comedian's skit, which was neither stupid nor base, was attacked all
night.
(4) The comedian's skit, which was neither base nor stupid, was attacked all
night.
Since the underlying analyses of the two sentences probably do not differ in complexity
because each contains base and stupid in conjunction, one would predict no differences
2
in the ability to recall such sentences. Gleidman demonstrated, however, that sen-
tences like (3) are harder to recall than those like (4). He claimed that the difference
should be attributed to a surface phenomenon; i. e. , the separation of the categorically
ambiguous word, base, from a context in which the inappropriate category could be used
in projecting partial analysis of the string. He concluded that the representation of such
sentences in memory is best characterized by their surface form, rather than by some
underlying form.
Similarly, he suggested that the separation of words belonging to identical categories
(and, therefore, presumably confusable) would aid recall. Indeed, he found that sen-
tences like (6), in which forgetting which verb goes with which phrase has disastrous
effect on the meaning of the sentence, were harder to recall than those like (5). Again,
both sentences
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(5) The man whom the woman watched often kissed the child.
(6) The man whom the woman often watched kissed the child.
have underlying analyses of nearly identical complexity.
Differences in performance on such memory tasks do not necessarily arise from
memory processes alone. If sentence perception is in part assigning structure to a
string of words, then strings that permit the assignment of inappropriate substructures
or are difficult to segment structurally might be more difficult to perceive than strings
of the same words in arrangements that lower the chances for misassignments of struc-
ture. Unless special procedures were adopted during learning sessions, these per-
ceptual difficulties would persist as a memory deficit.
Whether the task at hand be memory or perception, sentence processing depends in
part on using the lexical information contained by words in order to determine which
structures contain those words. Therefore, strings containing categorically ambiguous
words would, on the whole, be harder to process if these words occur in contexts that
may be misinterpreted when the wrong category is assigned to the ambiguous word. In
sentences (3) and (4) the potential misinterpretation can be avoided by choice of word
order. On the other hand, the order of verbs in (5) and (6) has no effect on processing
difficulty; consequently, there is no reason to suppose that one or another is preferred.
To test these possibilities, subjects were asked to complete such sentences in which
the critical phrases were replaced by a blank and a list of words to be used in filling
the blank. They more often changed list order to the "easier" version of (3) and (4),
but they did not favor either order of verbs in (5) and (6).
This finding leaves open the question whether the subjects were choosing to avoid
difficulty in remembering, in perceiving or in both. But it is clear that they only con-
strained structure so as to minimize processing complexity. As we have remarked,
the underlying structures of (3) and (4) must be identical; therefore, it seems equally
clear that "complexity" is confined to surface form in this case. That is, one
apparently imposes constraints on the surface form of sentences that are dic-
tated by performance.
E. C. T. Walker
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E. EXPERIMENTS ON THE PERCEPTION OF AMBIGUOUS SENTENCES
Several recent psychological experiments have focused on the possible perceptual
consequences of ambiguity. The results of these experiments have been varied. In a
"verification task" (the subject's task is to determine the truth value of a sentence by
reference to an immediately following picture), Foss, Bever, and Silver, I for example,
found only "garden path" effects for ambiguous sentences. Mehler, Carey, and Bever 2
have recently obtained a similar result with a slightly different paradigm. In these
experiments the reaction time in the verification task is compared for ambiguous sen-
tences and their unambiguous control counterparts. Verification time was greater for
the ambiguous sentences than for their unambiguous counterparts only in circumstances
that required the "unexpected" reading of the ambiguous sentence (where expectancy is
manipulated by the experimenter through changes in context, or where expectancy is
determined by pre- or post-test of the ambiguous sentences). These experiments have
been interpreted as showing that in normal sentence comprehension listeners imme-
diately select only one reading for a sentence, even when there are multiple possible
interpretations; it is only when the posterior context shows that the wrong selection was
made that consequences of ambiguity are found.
On the other hand, MacKay 3 found a significant difference between ambiguous sen-
tences and their unambiguous control counterparts in a sentence completion task, in
which subjects are presented with an initial fragment of a sentence and are required
to provide a grammatical and meaningful completion. Subjects in this experiment were
not aware of the ambiguity but, nonetheless, showed an apparent effect of interference
from the "unused" meaning in the facility with which they performed the completion
task. More recently Foss 4 has found an effect of both terms of lexical ambiguities in
a phoneme monitor task, in which the subject's task is to indicate the point of occurrence
of a particular speech sound during the aural presentation of a sentence. Both of these
experiments indicate that the processing of ambiguous sentences differs from the pro-
cessing of unambiguous sentences. At this point two things are needed: first, additional
evidence that the presence of an ambiguity affects computation, and second, some
account of the computational process which will rationalize the different outcomes of
the several experiments mentioned above. Two experiments are reported here that
provide some information on each of these points.
1. BIASING THE INTERPRETATION OF AMBIGUOUS SENTENCES
DURING DICHOTIC LISTENING
We assume that the structural description for a sentence is computed by its hearer
during its input and, further, that the interpretation of a sentence is complete within at
most a few hundred milliseconds following its termination. Given such a circumstance,
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we may inquire what computational procedures are followed when the hearer is con-
fronted with an ambiguous sentence. Roughly there seem to be three possibilities:
(i) the hearer can compute both (all) the structural descriptions for the sentence;
(ii) he can hold computation in abeyance for some period, using posterior as well as
prior context in the decision; (iii) he can choose one structural option and compute that,
accepting the possibility of error. Experiments using the verification task appear to
argue for (iii); experiments with the monitor task and the sentence completion task
appear to argue for (i) or (ii). In all three cases, of course, it is assumed that "ulti-
mately" one reading is selected. The question is, What computational processes underlie
that selection and at what point do they occur? We report the first in a series of experi-
ments aimed at a choice among these possibilities; we use a paradigm quite different
from those previously employed to investigate the effects of ambiguity.
The experimental situation uses the dichotic presentation of an ambiguous sentence
and a disambiguating context sentence. Thus, a subject in the experiment might be
presented with an ambiguous sentence such as (a) in one ear, and at the same time be
presented with a biasing context sentence such as (b) in the other ear.
(a) The spy put out the torch as a signal to attack.
(b) The spy extinguished the torch.
The subject is told to attend to the ear that receives the ambiguous sentence, and his
task is to provide as quickly as possible a paraphrase of the stimulus sentence. Subjects
are led to believe that the test is one of ability to resist distraction. They do not know
that the materials presented to the two ears are related, nor do they know that one of
the sentences is ambiguous. The disambiguating context sentence is presented during
the presentation of the ambiguous sentence, but slightly delayed, so that the occurrence
of the disambiguating context never precedes the occurrence of the ambiguous portion
of the ambiguous sentence.
In the presentation of the ambiguous sentence and the biasing context sentence the
level of the two sentences is adjusted so that the biasing sentence is approximately 5 dB
down from the level of the ambiguous stimulus sentence. The level of the biasing con-
text sentence is quite understandable in monaural presentation; that is, when the
ambiguous sentence channel is turned off, the context sentences are readily under-
standable. When both the context sentences and the ambiguous sentences are presented
simultaneously, the context sentences (the weaker channel) were difficult to follow
consistently, even when our pilot subjects attempted to do so. Under the conditions of
the experiment, however, subjects were instructed to attend to the stronger of the two
channels; they were told to ignore the material in the less intense channel over which
the context sentences were presented.
There are assumptions that must be made concerning this experimental situation.
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The fundamental one, however, is that the possibility of influencing a subject's inter-
pretation of the ambiguous sentences through the biasing material presented in the
"unattended" ear rests on whether more than a single structural description for the
ambiguous sentence is computed. If (iii) of the computational possibilities mentioned
above is true, there should be no effect of the biasing context sentences in this situation,
since choice is made before the occurrence of the bias. If bias in the interpretation of
the ambiguous sentence should occur as a function of the context sentences, this would
argue for computational strategy (i) (or possibly (ii)). That is, it is difficult to see how
the material in the "unattended" biasing ear could affect the ambiguous material, unless
the structural description relevant to the biasing context were computed.
A further inference is possible: if option (iii) (subjects pick a single reading of an
ambiguous sentence and compute that) is correct, it should be the case that in certain
conditions, subjects will become aware of the ambiguity of the stimulus sentences more
frequently. When the two readings for the ambiguous sentence are of unequal probabili-
ties (the usual case) and where the biasing context sentence is appropriate to the
less probable meaning, subjects will quite often be in the position of having picked a
description of the sentence which is at variance with the biasing context. If they do
pick up information from the biasing context sentence, this incongruity may bring
the ambiguity to their notice.
Procedure
Sets of stimulus sentences and appropriate biasing contexts were constructed for
several types of ambiguities: lexical ambiguities (e. g., "the sailors enjoyed the port
their captain recommended"); bracketing ambiguities (e. g., "John greeted the boy with
a smile on his face"); deep structure ambiguities (e. g., "the mayor ordered the police
to stop drinking after midnight"). There were 20 lexical ambiguities (half of these
were verb-particle ambiguities), 10 bracketing ambiguities, and 10 deep structure
ambiguities.
The ambiguous sentences were recorded and three copies of each sentence were
made. The three copies were "paired" (i. e., ambiguity on channel 1, and context
on channel 2), respectively, with a bias for reading one (RI), a biasing sentence for
reading two (R2), and a neutral context control sentence. (The designation of the
readings as R1 and R2Z was arbitrary, with the proviso that high and low probability
readings be about equally represented in the R1 and R2 sets.) These pairs were then
sorted into three stimulus tapes so that each tape contained one-third ambiguous sen-
tences with Rl context, one-third with R2 context, and one-third with the neutral con-
text. The set of three stimulus tapes thus contained a representatior of each ambiguity
with bias for both of its readings and a control condition.
The biasing contexts were pre-tested; those biasing sentences selected were such
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that 100% of the pre-test subjects chose the intended reading in the presence of that
bias. Base probabilities for the ambiguities were taken in the presence of the neutral
context sentence.
Following warm-up and practice trials, three sets of 15 subjects were presented
with the 3 stimulus tapes; thus, there were 15 observations for each ambiguous sen-
tence in each of the 3 conditions. The presentations were counterbalanced for right
and left ears. The effect of bias was assessed by subtracting the proportion, for
example, of Rl that occurred in the neutral context condition from the proportion of
R1 that occurred in the R1 base condition; and similarly for R2. Thus direction and
magnitude of the biasing effect could be assessed.
Results
Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks tests were run across the sets of stimulus
sentences; for both Ri bias and RZ bias all ambiguity types showed a significant effect
(p < . 05, two tails). The biasing contexts were extremely effective in influencing the
reading assigned to the ambiguous stimulus sentence in every condition. There is
some indication that the bracketing ambiguities were affected less than the other
types. No effect of the "ear" to which bias was presented was observed.
Discussion
Evidently, both readings of the ambiguous sentence are in some sense available
during the computation of the structural description for the sentence. Can we inter-
pret this result as evidence for simultaneous processing of more than a single reading
for ambiguous sentences? Post-test interviews of subjects did not discover any subject
who was aware of the ambiguous nature of the stimulus sentences. Subjects were also
questioned about the nature of the material in the "unattended" ear. No subject could
report even approximately the materials in the unattended ear; many of the subjects
were, in fact, surprised when informed that the materials in the unattended ear were
sentences. None reported a relation between the material in the unattended ear and that
in the attended ear.
Nonetheless, many of the reports of the ambiguous sentences obviously incorporated
information from the unattended channel. How are we to account for this? We do not
believe that this is a case of the mythical beast "subception." What we think occurs
is that the subject does obtain material from the unattended channel but is simply
mistaken about which ear he heard it in. When the material in the unattended channel
is appropriate to an interpretation of the ambiguous sentence, the subject simply inte-
grates it into the material from the attended channel without ever becoming aware of
doing so.
The fact that there is a very strong effect of the biasing context under conditions
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in which the subjects were not aware of the ambiguity and under conditions where such
effects take place during the interpretation of the ambiguous sentence seems to argue
strongly for a view of the analysis of ambiguous sentences which involves at least
partial computation of both structural descriptions. In subsequent experiments we
intend to more systematically manipulate the temporal relation between disambiguating
context and ambiguous sequence, and to investigate further the effect of clause bound-
aries on the possibilities of bias.
J. Lackner, M. F. Garrett
2. AMBIGUITY INCREASES THE COMPLEXITY OF PERCEPTUALLY
INCOMPLETE CLAUSES
If the presence of an ambiguity results in an increase in the perceptual complexity
of a sentence (e. g. , by reason of the computation of both structural descriptions), it
does not do so overtly. That is, we are seldom aware of the ambiguity of ambiguous
sentences. A selection of one of the readings is almost invariably made, regardless
of how many interpretations may be unconsciously computed. Whatever vexation ambi-
guity may bring to the 'unconscious sentence processor,' the conscious mind of the
hearer proceeds in splendid indifference to the ambiguity so frequently encountered
in normal conversational interchange. How is this accomplished?
The experiment discussed in Section E. 1 suggests that one aspect of the process
may involve the computation of more than a single reading for an ambiguous sequence.
This condition of "uncertainty" does not persist for long, however, as the verification
task experiments of Foss, et al.1 and Mehler, et al. 2 attest. In the experiment reported
here we find evidence that the point beyond which disparate structural options are not
pursued is the clause boundary. A resolution of the apparent incompatibility of the
results, for example,' of verification task and monitor task experiments may lie in the
observation that the complication attributable to ambiguity is internal to the sentence,
or more precisely, internal to the particular clause containing the ambiguity. Once
the sentence or clause is terminated, no further effect of the presence of the ambiguity
is measurable; thus the results of the verification task. Measures taken during the
computation of the structure of clause or sentence may show effects of an ambiguity;
thus the effects of the monitor task experiments.
In an effort to evaluate these views, we considered the sentence completion paradigm
of MacKay.3 MacKay set subjects the task of providing as quickly as possible a gram-
matical and semantically acceptable completion to a fragment of a sentence. For
example, a subject might be presented with the fragment
"Although the solution seemed clear in chemistry class..."
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The efficiency of subject's completion of this fragment was compared with completions
for control fragments like
"Although the answer seemed clear in chemistry class..."
In MacKay's experiments it was the case that fragments containing an ambiguity showed
significantly longer completion times than their control counterparts. MacKay had
a variety of types of fragments. Some were like the examples given above which
terminate at a clause boundary. Others terminated internal to a clause boundary, for
example,
"Although the solution seemed clear in chemistry class, I..."
and
"Although the solution seemed clear in..."
A reanalysis of MacKay's published data revealed that the significance of his results
was primarily attributable to cases in which an incomplete clause was presented as
the test fragment. Thus initial support for the view that the clause marks the ter-
mination of the effect of an ambiguity was provided. The present experiment uses a
sentence completion paradigm similar to MacKay's, but with the variable of clause
completion manipulated.
Procedure
Six incomplete sentence fragments 5 to 12 words in length of each type of ambiguity
mentioned above were constructed. Each fragment had three ambiguous and three non-
ambiguous versions: in one ambiguous version the fragment was an incomplete clause,
e.g., (a); in a second version it was a complete clause, e. g., (b); and in the third
version it was a complete clause with the addition of the first word of a second
clause, e.g., (c). There were parallel versions for the unambiguous control fragments,
e.g., (d), (e), and (f).
(a) After taking the right turn at the
(b) After taking the right turn at the intersection
(c) After taking the right turn at the intersection, I
(d) After taking the left turn at the
(e) After taking the left turn at the intersection
(f) After taking the left turn at the intersection, I
In this study we used only one of the possible nonambiguous interpretations as the con-
trol for each ambiguous fragment.
The fragments were typed on 6 X 8 file cards. Six experimental groups were pre-
pared so that each group contained one fragment of each type from the 18 different
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types (ambiguous vs unambiguous control X 3 types of ambiguity X 3 fragment types =
18 stimulus types).
Forty-eight paid volunteer subjects (native English speakers) were run, 8 in each
of 6 groups required for counterbalancing. A subject was instructed to turn over the
card (which was presented face down), read the sentence fragment to himself, and then
read the fragment and a completion aloud as soon as he was able. Responses were tape-
recorded and timed from presentation of the fragment. S was instructed to make his
completion as well formed and relevant to the sentence as possible. In post-tests S
was asked whether he noticed it was ambiguous during the experimental session. The
very few responses where an ambiguity was noticed were excluded from analysis.
Results
The scores computed were delays from presentation of the fragment to the onset
of vocalization for the completion attempt (i. e., "thinking time"). Overall, ambiguous
sentence fragments do require longer "thinking" times to complete than do their
corresponding unambiguous counterparts (p < . 001, two-tail Wilcoxon matched pairs,
signed ranks test across subjects). Most interesting, however, is the fact that all
of the relative effect of ambiguous fragments was due to those fragment types that
ended internal to the first clause (example (a) above). Only for such fragments is
the difference between ambiguous responses and their controls significant (there is
not even a trend in the other cases).
Discussion
If an ambiguous fragment is broken off before the clause completion, then two
interpretations are both still available and involve added processing complexity. If
the fragment is broken off at or just after its completion, then the fact that more than
one meaning was originally possible makes no effective difference - after a complete
interpretation is assigned by the subject to the string, the fact that it was originally
ambiguous does not affect subsequent performance (so long as either meaning is sit-
uationally acceptable as it was here).
Further research is required on certain aspects of this study. Response times
varied greatly among S's; it is unlikely that fast and slow responding subjects are using
the same strategies. Second, there was great variability among individual fragments;
thus the findings must be supplemented with larger varieties of sentences and different
response techniques. Most important, however, is the apparently paradoxical result
that some fragments with underlying structure ambiguities were responded to faster
than their controls: just those underlying structure fragments which terminated at a
clause boundary, i. e. , were perceptually complete units (example (b) above) (p < . 01
for thinking time). This effect, which did not appear for the other kinds of ambiguities,
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argues that ambiguity is coped with by parallel computation of both interpretations
rather than by holding computation in abeyance. More direct experimental testing of
this possibility is being carried out.
T. G. Bever, M. F. Garrett, R. Hurtig
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